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Abstract:  Between October, 2007 and January, 2009 there were four catastrophic 
aircraft accidents in the United States caused by collisions between birds and aircraft.  
Four aircraft were destroyed and 15 people killed in these accidents.  In North America 
we place great importance on airport wildlife control, however none of these accidents 
would have been prevented by improved airport wildlife control.  This reveals a gap in 
our safety management plan for preventing/reducing wildlife hazards to aircraft.  This 
paper explains, using case studies, successful aviation mitigation methodologies used in 
the past to mitigate other aviation hazards such as wind shear, volcanic ash, winter 
operations including deicing and reduced runway friction.  There is no reason that 
aviation wildlife mitigation should not adopt and use these successful strategies to close 
the existing gap and improve safety.  Unfortunately too many working in this field have 
little knowledge of aviation safety strategies and therefore are groping in the dark for 
solutions.  The understanding and application of successful methodologies is integral to 
any solution for this hazard. 
 
Introduction 
Every day in aviation we cope with a variety of hazards, many of them natural 
phenomenon such as wind shear, volcanic ash, or icing.  By themselves these natural 
phenomenon are extremely hazardous to aircraft, witnessed by the significant number of 
catastrophic aircraft accidents caused by improper operations around these hazards.   
 
Unfortunately, for a number of reasons better discussed elsewhere, the conflict between 
increasing bird populations and increasing aviation activity has indicated that we no 
longer have our desired safety level.   
 
During the 16 month period from October 2007 until January 2009, in the United States, 
we suffered four catastrophic aircraft accidents caused by collisions with birds.  A review 
of these accident details is in order: 
 
October 2007: a Piper Seneca, a twin engine propeller plane owned by the University of 
North Dakota, was enroute from a fueling stop in St. Paul, Minnesota to its home base in 
North Dakota.  Enroute the flight, operating at night, collided with a flock of migrating 
Canada geese.  The collision caused significant damage to the aircraft, loss of control and 
crash, killing both crew members. 
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March, 2008: a Cessna Citation twin engine business jet departed Wiley Post Airport in 
the Oklahoma City area.  During climb out, passing around 3,000’, the aircraft collided 
with a flock of migrating white pelicans.  One engine failed and the right wing was 
significantly damaged, causing loss of control and crash killing all five people on board. 
 
January, 2009: a Petroleum Helicopters S-76 aircraft, enroute at low level in southern 
Louisiana had its front canopy penetrated by some type of large bird.  Either the crew or 
the engine controls were disabled by the collision and the aircraft crashed, killing 8 of 9 
occupants.   
 
January, 2009: a USAirways A320 departing New York’s LaGuardia Airport collided 
with a flock of migrating Canada geese at around 3,000’.  Both of the aircraft’s engines 
failed due to bird ingestion.  Fortunately the aircraft was successfully ditched in the 
Hudson River.  Although the aircraft was destroyed no occupants were killed. 
 
Discussion 
It should be noted that the above four accidents involve virtually all categories of civil 
aviation in North America today: general aviation, corporate jet, transport helicopter, 
airline transport aircraft.  Clearly the facts indicate that bird collisions are a hazard for all 
types of aircraft.  Further, all of the accidents happened away from the airport: the UND 
Seneca accident and the PI helicopter accident both occurred in the enroute phase of 
flight.  Both the Citation and A320 accidents happened on climb, while passing about 
3,000’, several miles from the airport.  Three of the four accident aircraft appear to have 
encountered migrating waterfowl, not local birds attracted to an airport area.  Currently 
there are no policies, procedures or mitigation designed to avoid this hazard or escape 
from it if encountered.  Nor is there training for flight crews on the bird strike hazard, 
unlike other hazard such as wind shear, volcanic ash or winter operations. 
 
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization), which sets worldwide standards for 
aviation, mandated, in 2004, wildlife control on airports as a standard.  Many state 
regulatory agencies, such as the FAA, Transport Canada, etc., amended their rules to 
require airport wildlife control.   
 
However we have effective mitigation in place for previous aviation killers such as wind 
shear; winter operations such as deicing, reduced runway friction and volcanic ash. A 
discussion of these mitigation techniques will reveal successful techniques which can be 
applied to successfully mitigate the aviation wildlife hazard. 
 
 
 
Fundamentals and Definitions 
In aviation we rarely have the opportunity to ‘solve’ hazards, particularly natural 
phenomenon.  “Solve” means to fix a problem so that the problem no longer exists.  We 
rarely are able to do that in aviation.  Instead we “mitigate” the problem, or reduce its 
severity by certain acts to reduce its risk to an acceptable level.   
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Likewise “risk” in aviation is the exposure, probability and severity of a hazard, 
quantified to describe the likelihood of an event resulting in a catastrophe.  We measure 
risk in various ways, but the measurement is always the likelihood of that event resulting 
in a catastrophe.   
 
“Catastrophe” in aviation is defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), which sets worldwide standards and recommended practices for aviation.  Under 
the ICAO guidelines “catastrophe” occurs when an event results in an aircraft destroyed 
or a fatality.   
 
In aviation we have established a standard of safety.  That standard is one catastrophe in 
every billion events, or 1 X 10 (-9).  That standard represents freedom from catastrophe, 
i.e., one crash every billion events.  This standard does not consider damage, only 
freedom from catastrophe.  This is the standard to which modern jet transport aircraft, 
engines and operations are designed. 
 
“Policy” means those procedures which air carrier employees will follow when 
confronted by a given situation.  “Flight operations manual (FOM)” is a book of policies 
which an airline corporation has developed to control its daily flight operations.  This 
flight operations manual, in the U.S., is then submitted to the government regulatory 
agency, FAA Flight Standards and its representatives for that airline, to approve or 
amend.  Once accepted by the FAA and the airline corporation this FOM then carries the 
force of law and is the controlling document for that airline’s flight operations. 
 
 
Successful mitigation of other aviation hazards 
Windshear: windshear can be described as a rapid change in wind speed and/or direction 
over a short distance; it can be accompanied by strong turbulence.  Most significant wind 
shears are associated with thunderstorm activity.  A microburst is a type of wind shear 
characterized by a downdraft of air, limited in areal extent, which can exceed 3,000 feet 
per minute and create airspeed losses of between 40 and 90 knots.  Wind shears 
encountered at low altitude are extremely dangerous and have resulted in significant 
catastrophes worldwide. 
 
Not too many years ago the words ‘wind shear’ were not in our aviation lexicon because 
we did not understand what was happening.  After significant catastrophes at New 
Orleans, Dallas/Ft. Worth and Denver industry and government working groups formed 
to address the hazard.  Meteorologists were consulted to learn of the mechanics of wind 
shear.  Mitigation was developed.  Policy was created based upon the mitigation.  The 
policy was trained and then the policy was implemented.  On airports a wind shear 
detection system was installed to measure winds and give warning of wind shears.  Air 
traffic controllers relayed these standardized warnings to flight crews, who then 
implemented policy steps to avoid the wind shears.  Later other technology, like Doppler 
radar and predictive cockpit windshear devices were developed and deployed.  However, 
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we took the first step in defining the problem and then deploying the airport wind shear 
detection system prior to having full technology available.   
 
Policy guidance, based upon our definition of the hazard, is provided to front line 
operational employees such as flight crews.  They are taught how to recognize wind 
shear, how to avoid wind shear and how to escape from wind shear if encountering it.  
Further, policy guidance is established to provide clarification as to authorized operations 
in the vicinity of wind shear.  A major airline’s policy may recite: “Takeoffs, approaches 
and landing are not authorized when runway-specific wind shear or microburst alerts are 
in effect for your flight’s intended runway”.  This policy leaves no doubt as to approved 
operations in conjunction with this hazard.  Delay is sometimes one of our most 
successful mitigation strategies for a variety of natural phenomenon.   
 
Winter operations 
Deicing: Snow and ice accumulation on aircraft wings and tail surfaces can reduce or 
destroy lift over those surfaces, making it impossible for aircraft so contaminated to fly.  
In previous years a certain amount of snow or ice was tolerated on aircraft surfaces under 
the misguided principal that the aircraft could ‘carry some ice’.  This may have been so in 
the early days of propeller aircraft but modern swept wing jet aircraft are much more 
intolerant of contaminants.  As a result we had several takeoff catastrophes caused by the 
attempted operation of aircraft which had not been properly deiced.  Industry and 
government working groups were then formed to address the deicing issue.  New deicing 
fluids, such as Type I and, later, Types II and IV, were developed and deployed.  New 
policy guidelines governing proper deicing procedures were also developed. 
 
Among these new policy guidelines was a revision of the Federal Aviation Rule 
governing deicing.  Currently FAR Part 121.629 prohibits “…attempting a takeoff when 
frost, snow, or ice is adhering to the wings or control surfaces of the aircraft”.  Further 
policy guidance may be issued by individual air carriers for the operation of their fleet.  
One such carrier issued the following policy guidance:  
“Takeoff is prohibited in: 
Moderate freezing rain 
Heavy freezing rain 
Heavy freezing drizzle 
Heavy ice pellets”.   
Once again we see delay utilized as an effective mitigation strategy to improve safety. 
 
Reduced runway friction: Snow and ice may also accumulate on runways or taxiways.  
Such accumulation will reduce the braking effectiveness of stopping techniques such as 
wheel brakes or engine reverse thrust.  This runway contamination can also affect lateral 
control of the aircraft by either the rudder or nose wheel steering, particularly in cross 
winds.  Since aircraft cross winds limitations were developed by the manufacturer during 
certification using test pilots landing on dry runways, cross wind operations on 
contaminated runways have resulted in aircraft sliding off the side of the runway due to 
lack of runway friction.  As a result some carriers developed policy to mitigate this risk.  
For example, on the A-330 the maximum crosswind limitation is 32 knots.  One carrier 
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developed the policy of issuing guidelines to flight crews reducing the maximum allowed 
crosswind depending upon runway friction, i.e.,  with braking action reported as only 
‘medium’ (MU.39-.30), the recommended maximum crosswind should be only 20 knots.  
With runway friction reported as ‘poor’ (MU .20 and less) “no operations are 
authorized”.  In this case we are willing to trade some operational flexibility for improved 
operational safety.   
 
Volcanic ash: eruption of volcanoes around the world was a new phenomenon to the 
world’s jet fleets.  The ash ejected by an erupting volcano contains a variety of material, 
all of it bad for ingestion into jet engines.  Volcanic ash can be ejected as high as 60,000’ 
and lighter portions of the ash cloud can travel down wind over 1,000 miles.  Volcanic 
ash can not only adhere to fan blades but choke off airflow through the engine entirely, 
causing severe engine damage.  On at least two occasions B-747 aircraft, flying at night, 
encountered volcanic ash and lost power on all four engines.  On descent for night ocean 
ditchings the aircraft exited the ash cloud and were able to recover enough power to 
safely divert to nearby airports. 
 
ICAO convened a worldwide project on volcanic ash.  The hazard was defined, 
mitigation was developed, as was policy for the recognition of volcanic ash, avoidance of 
the ash cloud and mitigation steps to reduce its severity should an ash cloud be 
encountered.  Currently, worldwide, a system of volcano watch stations has been 
implemented.  When a volcano is detected erupting the news is quickly flashed around 
the world to various aviation interests.  Since the ability to effectively track the volcanic 
ash cloud is somewhat limited in technology, the generally accepted mitigation is to 
reroute aircraft well away from the area of the eruption or cease operations entirely.  The 
policy of one air carrier regarding volcanic ash is stated as: “A volcanic ash cloud will be 
avoided for the first 24 hours following the end of a volcanic eruption”.   
 
 
Results of lack of successful mitigation 
Recently the Belgium AAIB released the results of its investigation into the Kalitta 
Airlines B747-200 accident in Brussels in 2008.  During the takeoff the #3 engine 
ingested a small raptor  causing the engine to make loud banging noises.  The captain 
aborted the takeoff at high speed and the aircraft overran the end of the runway and broke 
up.  Although nobody was killed, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.  While the 
investigation revealed a number of interesting points, of interest to the birdstrike 
community was the discovery that the Brussels airport’s wildlife control manager was a 
part time job.  Additionally the only qualification to be part of the airport’s bird control 
team was to posses a Belgium hunting license.   
 
A separate investigation by the Italian ANSV into a Delta Airlines serious incident in 
Rome in 2007 lead to the flight crew’s actions being questioned.  As the Delta B-767-400 
taxied out in Rome the flight crew observed large numbers of gulls on the airport.  The 
crew discussed the birds, as revealed by the cockpit voice recorder, but never reported the 
presence of the birds to ATC, the airport or Delta operations in Rome.  Neither did the 
crew request a bird scare to disperse the birds from the intended flight path prior to 
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takeoff.  Instead the crew took off anyway, ingesting large numbers of yellow-legged 
gulls (similar to Herring gulls) into both engines.  The engines lost power and vibrated 
severely, a very bad situation considering that the aircraft was at its maximum gross 
weight for takeoff.  The crew later stated they were afraid that they would not make it 
back to the airport.  The aircraft returned for a safe landing but post flight inspection 
revealed that both engines were severely damaged and had to be replaced, not repaired.  
This crew violated no policy or regulation in their actions because there are no policies, 
regulations or training for flight crews on this hazard.   
 
In another investigation, that of USAirways 1549, US Department of Agriculture 
Wildlife Services personnel submitted proposed solutions to the wildlife problem to the 
US NTSB.  One of these solutions was to:”…focus wildlife hazard mitigation efforts on 
the airport.”  This proposed solution was based upon examination of 30 ‘hull losses’ by 
turbine powered transport jet aircraft.  This metric, transport jet aircraft, completely 
ignores 3 of the 4 catastrophic accidents in the US between October 2007 and January 
2009 as those accident aircraft did not fit into this category.  Further, once the data behind 
these hull losses is examined it indicates these hull losses date back a number of decades, 
as far as 1968.  In 2004 ICAO amended the SARPS to mandate wildlife control on 
airports as a standard.  Worldwide state governments amended their rules and procedures 
to comply.  In the US the FAA amended Part 139 to require wildlife control on airports 
and training for airports personnel in the hazard.  Therefore this ‘hull loss’ data has been 
addressed and airports have received focus and mitigation.  Proof of the effectiveness of 
this mitigation is the fact that since the 2004 change there have been no catastrophic 
accidents on US airports.  However there have been four catastrophic accidents in the US 
between October 2007 and January 2009.  No proposed solutions to these four accidents 
were forthcoming from the USDA personnel.  One reason for this shortcoming may be 
that no USDA personnel have received any formal training in safety management. The 
argument here is not that USDA personnel do not care about these fatal accidents, rather 
that Agriculture Department personnel do not have proper education and experience in 
safety management to effectively make recommendations regarding aviation programs.  
Indeed, the USDA proposal diverts attention and mitigation efforts away from solving the 
catastrophic accidents to an area, the airport, where our mitigation is working properly.  It 
could be said that these types of suggestions actually decrease safety. 
 
No comprehensive plan 
While we have work ongoing in a number of areas of the aviation wildlife hazard, we 
have no plan and no guidelines on how this work should properly integrate and where the 
actual gaps in our safety plan reside.  There is no relationship between airport work and 
aircraft/engine certification, no training for front line employees in many areas and no 
focal point for coordination of the efforts.  ICAO, in development of Safety Management 
Systems (SMS), defines the three basic defenses against risk as: technology, training and 
regulation.  Yet there is no integration of these factors addressing this hazard, nor is any 
party in industry or government calling for such a comprehensive, integrated plan such as 
we currently deploy in mitigating wind shear, volcanic ash or winter operations.  
Additionally there is no current ‘coach’ for this team.  Airports can’t be held responsible 
for accidents occurring miles from their location, regulators such as FAA Airports can’t 
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exercise authority of areas outside of their jurisdiction and organizations such as 
Birdstrike Committee USA could lead but only if it becomes more diverse.  Currently 
BSCUSA is limited by the fact that 76% of the members of the steering committee of 
BSCUSA are biologists; zero percent come from the flying community. 
 
 
Conclusion - Solution for effective mitigation 
Based upon the above case studies of successful mitigation of hazardous natural 
phenomenon in aviation, a successful wildlife mitigation plan can be devised.  
Development of such a plan will require the participation of both government and 
industry groups.  It will also require a sponsor or focal point.  Working groups should be 
formed for the following areas: 
 
Working Group on Training 
This Group’s task would be to develop training for all personnel involved in all facets of 
mitigation: airport operations, flight crews, ground crews, government workers, etc.  
Additionally this Group should recommend training programs for such entities as flight 
schools, airline operators and other organizations responsible for airport and aviation 
operations. 
 
Working Group on Regulations 
This Group’s task would be to develop policy and regulation equivalent to that in place 
with other aviation hazards. Regulations and policy could address the need for training 
plans by air operators; speed limits such as 250 knots below 10,000’; flight profiles 
which reduce risk in high bird concentration area, etc.   Policy should be comprehensive 
and examine all facets of the hazard.  Such policy would serve as the ‘standard’ for 
aviation operations in the presence of wildlife hazards. 
 
Working Group on Technology 
This Group’s task would be to review and recommend technologies, such as data 
collection methodologies, integrated warning systems, comprehensive planning tools 
such as a civil version of the USAF BAM, for further funding for research and 
deployment.  It must develop a cost analysis and protocols for use of technologies. 
 
Finally, Working Groups should establish and adhere to a timeline for delivery of their 
finished products.  The products should receive the widest distribution to industry and 
government and have the full backing and confidence of both.   
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